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9   Wesley’s Engagement with the Natural Sciences
Randy L. Maddox
Among the many topics that could be included in a Companion to John
Wesley, readers might be surprised to find a chapter devoted to Wesley’s
engagement with the natural sciences.1 Or, based on some influential
precedents, they may anticipate an exposé of Wesley’s opposition to scientific
theories and reasoning. Over a century ago, in his History of English Thought
in the Eighteenth Century (1876), Sir Leslie Stephen contended that “we
already find in Wesley the aversion to scientific reasoning which has become
characteristic of orthodox theologians” (2:412). Andrew Dickson White
echoed this evaluation twenty years later in his (in)famous History of the
Warfare of Science with Theology in Christendom (1896).
One shortcoming of these critiques of Wesley is that they relied mainly
on secondary sources and passing comments in his Sermons and Journal. As a
result, they provide little sense of the scope of Wesley’s interest in and
publications about the natural world. In 1763 Wesley issued for the benefit of
his Methodist people A Survey of the Wisdom of God in Creation; or, A
Compendium of Natural Philosophy, a two-volume work distilling his reading
of several book-length works as well as extracts from the Philosophical
Transactions of the Royal Society for the Improvement of Natural Knowledge
and other journals. By its third edition in 1777 this Survey had grown into a
five-volume collection. To increase its availability to his followers, Wesley
serialized excerpts from the Survey in his monthly Arminian Magazine
beginning in 1781. In addition to this broad ranging work, he also published
The Desideratum; or, Electricity Made Plain and Useful (1760) and included a
number of short pieces about unusual natural phenomena in the Arminian
Magazine.
1For more discussion and documentation of points in this chapter, see
Randy L. Maddox,“John Wesley’s Precedent for Theological Engagement with the
Natural Sciences,” Wesleyan Theological Journal 44.1 (Spring 2009).
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These broader works have been central to a lesser-known series of
positive appeals to Wesley’s precedent for theological engagement with the
natural sciences, which paralleled the negative evaluations. For example, in
1893 William Mills gave a lecture on “John Wesley an Evolutionist” at the
Chit-Chat Club in San Francisco. The lecture was circulated as a booklet and a
summary was published in Popular Science Monthly the following year.2
Sparked by Mills, James Lee enlightened readers of the Southern Magazine the
same year that “the founder of Methodism wrote out the whole theory of
evolution and the origin of species … eighty-four years before Mr. Darwin
published his celebrated work upon the same subject.”3 This astonishing claim
was echoed by several voices in the 1920s, championing Wesley as a
forerunner for accepting evolution in the midst of the controversy that peaked
in the Scopes trial. Some of these advocates broadened the argument,
presenting Wesley as a pioneer of scientific empiricism in general (in the mode
of Francis Bacon and John Locke) and of empirical theology in particular.4
The suggestion that Wesley advocated the evolution of species was
based on a misreading of his affirmation of the biological model of the “chain
of being” (see below).5 This was just one of many examples where both the
sneering dismissal and the sweeping praise of Wesley’s engagement with the
natural sciences betray their anachronistic nature—casting Wesley within the
scientific models and debates of their time, instead of evaluating his
publications on science topics within their original context.
Placing Wesley’s Engagement in Historical Context
The goal of this essay is to help readers avoid such anachronism, by
providing sufficient background to understand and appreciate Wesley’s
interactions with study of the natural world within their socio-historical 
2William Harrison Mills, John Wesley an Evolutionist (1893); summarized
in Popular Science Monthly 46 (1894–95): 284–85.
3James W. Lee, “A Methodist Evolutionist,” Southern Magazine
(Louisville) 4 (1894): 348.
4See in particular Frank Wilbur Collier, John Wesley Among the Scientists
(1928).
5They typically quote a passage about nature “raising herself to man” from
the ape in Wesley, Survey of the Wisdom of God in the Creation (4th edn., 1784),
4:102. But they fail to appreciate that this is a climb in quality of “being,” not in
time; as one emphasis of the “chain of being” model was that there is neither new
creation nor extinction of species.
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context. It builds on scattered similar efforts over the last half century, but
emphasizes insights from the recent flourishing in study of the history of
science and of Christian interactions with science.
Even the best treatments of Wesley to date have tended to share a set of
assumptions about the nature of the “science” he engaged. This is
understandable, because these assumptions were championed by standard
historical surveys—e.g., Herbert Butterfield, The Origins of Modern Science
(1949)—through most of the twentieth century. These surveys contended that
“science” was understood in England by the outset of the eighteenth century
among leading practitioners like Isaac Newton as a mode of inquiry that was: 
1) focused on elucidating how the processes of nature work, so that
these processes could be used for human betterment; 
2) grounded in a hypothetico-deductive methodology, wedding the
certainty of mathematics with the objectivity of rigorous empirical
verification of hypotheses; and
3) independent from religious constraints, thus at home in all cultures
and times.
If this model was firmly in place by Wesley’s day, then divergence in
his writings from these emphases could be read as resistance to science. Thus,
among characteristics that Stephen, White, and others have identified as “anti-
scientific” in Wesley are his demure from providing causal models for natural
phenomena, his criticism of relying on hypotheses in developing such models,
his hesitance to endorse Isaac Newton’s cosmology, his openness to
providential accounts of events like earthquakes, and his ascription to the
Genesis account of an idyllic creation (which conflicts with the Darwinian
model of evolution).
But recent scholarship on the history of science has demonstrated that
the emphases just listed for the “modern” understanding of science remained
contested among leading practitioners through most of the eighteenth century,
particularly in England.6 Three points that these scholars highlight are crucial
for understanding and evaluating Wesley’s writings in this genre.
6See Andrew Cunningham & Perry Williams, “De-centering the ‘Big
Picture’: The Origins of Modern Science and the Modern Origins of Science,”
British Journal for the History of Science 26 (1993): 407–32; and, more generally,
Peter J. Bowler & Iwan Rhys Morus, Making Modern Science: A Historical Survey
(2005).
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Transitional Character of “Science” in Eighteenth-Century England
First, this recent scholarship encourages us to take seriously that folk
like Isaac Newton labeled their studies of nature not “science” but “natural
philosophy” (e.g., Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica, 1697). This
latter name reflects important continuities with earlier academic study of
nature.
Medieval education stressed the difference between pursuing
understanding of reality (scientia; science) and acquiring practical knowledge
or know-how (ars; art). The base of university education was the seven liberal
arts: grammar, rhetoric, dialectic, arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and music.
These sets of practical knowledge provided the foundation for students to
approach the capstone study of the nature of reality itself (scientia)—in
philosophy and theology. By the eighteenth century, philosophy was
subdivided into logic, metaphysics, moral philosophy, and natural philosophy.
The latter was focused on understanding the natural world.
What then were the assumptions of natural philosophy about its task
and methods as it entered the eighteenth century?7 Consider the case of
studying the heavens. As a scientia, natural philosophy focused on questions
like what the heavens are made of; what moves the sun, moon, and planets;
and whether the universe is finite or infinite. By contrast, astronomy—as an
art (integrally connected to mathematics)—was devoted to tracking lights in
the sky, developing formalized descriptions and predictions of their
movements, offering reliable calendars, and other practical tasks. It had been
rare for astronomers to ask what the heavenly bodies were made of or why
they moved, while natural philosophers had devoted little attention to
mathematics or the practical use of their explanations of reality.
Challenges to these disciplinary distinctions began to emerge in the late
seventeenth century. On one front, Francis Bacon injected the suggestion,
which gained increasing hold, that the value of any study of nature was
proportionate to the technological benefits it provided for human betterment.
On another front, Newton’s Principia Mathematica began to elevate the
centrality of mathematics to accounts of the nature of the universe. By the
beginning of the nineteenth century these and other threads had woven
together the distinct agendas of scientia and 
7This summary draws on several sources; one of the most recent is Peter
Dear, The Intelligibility of Nature (2006), 1–14.
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ars in the study of nature. This reality was signaled by the fading of the label
“natural philosophy,” with “science” in its modern sense taking its place. But
this transition stretched through the eighteenth century in England, resulting in
numerous works with mixtures of the relevant emphases. Few works in this
period embody consistently the assumptions of “modern science” outlined
earlier, including Wesley’s Survey. The fact that Wesley discounted
mathematics in this “compendium of natural philosophy,” for example, is
evidence less of his resistance to “science” than of his location in this
transitional period.
Preference for “Experimental” over “Speculative” Natural Philosophy
Recent scholarship has also demonstrated that the field of natural
philosophy witnessed prolonged debate among competing models of physics
and cosmology in eighteenth-century England, with particular focus on
Newton.8 Everyone recognized that, with its mathematical advances
(particularly calculus), Newton’s Principia provided more accurate description
of the movements of planets, comets, and tides. But this was a task
traditionally assigned to the art of astronomy, not the explanatory goal of
natural philosophy, which Newton claimed in the title of his work. Thus
Newton’s Principia was often greeted by his professional peers with
puzzlement.
 Some background will aid in understanding this reaction. Through
most of the medieval period the reigning physics was that of Aristotle, which
accounted for all natural motion by “final causes” that were integral to every
type of being. Thus planets moved in their orbits because they were realizing
their entelechy (the “innate desire to fulfill one’s nature”). As the medieval
period waned, dissatisfaction with the anthropomorphic nature of this
explanation grew, spawning alternative mechanical accounts of motion in the
heavens. The starting premise of these accounts was that entelechy was limited
to living beings; physical matter was inert, and was moved solely by the
application of external force.
But how was this force applied? Here a divergence emerged within
mechanical accounts of cosmic motion, framed by the question of whether
space was a void. Accepting that space was a void made it difficult to account
for application of force at a distance, such as the influence of the moon on the
earth’s ocean tides. So most insisted that space was 
8Good surveys of these debates are available in The Cambridge History of
Science; Vol. IV: The Eighteenth Century, ed. Roy Porter (2003), 23–43; 285–304.
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entirely filled by matter of varying size, including sizes not visible to empirical
observation. René Descartes developed the most sophisticated mechanical
account in this vein, ascribing planetary motion to the carrying force of
vortices in this cosmic “stew.” If one instead accepted that space was a void,
they typically either attributed motion to direct causation by God or echoed
suggestions of earlier mystical thinkers about “resonance” across distance
between certain elements.
Newton stepped into the middle of these ongoing debates. Aligning
with the mechanists, he rejected entelechy, agreeing that matter was inert. Yet
he eventually spurned the suggestion of forms of matter too small for empirical
detection. This left space as a void. While Newton was willing to speak about
God intervening occasionally to adjust the motion of planets and other cosmic
bodies, he believed that the regularity and interdependence of this motion
indicated instead the presence of an abiding natural law. He named this law of
mutual influence of bodies upon one another “gravity.” But he immediately
conceded that he could not explain how gravity conveyed its impact across the
void of space. To many of his peers, Newton’s “gravity” seemed like an appeal
to discredited “mystical” influences. Most others simply concluded that he had
failed to do what natural philosophers were supposed to do—provide an
account of how the movements of bodies take place.
In hindsight, Newton ventured a promising suggestion about how
gravity worked in the “General Scholium” he added to the 2nd edition (1713) of
Principia. At the end of this short piece he referred to an “electric and elastic
spirit” that appears to pervade all gross bodies, noting that there was not yet
sufficient experimental input to provide an account of its impact.9 It would take
a century of further experimentation to detail electromagnetic fields, and
correlate these with gravitational fields. Only at this point was Newton’s
“natural philosophy” fully achieved. It is anachronistic to condemn many of
his professional peers, and more general readers like Wesley, for hesitating to
endorse Newton’s revision of cosmology and physics early in this process.10
But the key point to note in this episode is how Newton agreed with his
peers. His reason for rejecting Descartes’ cosmology was it’s reliance on the
“hypothesis” of imperceptible matter. Here Newton embodied the dominant
tendency in England by the late seventeenth century to reject “speculative”
natural philosophy, in favor of an 
9English translation, The Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy
(1729), 2:393.
10This general point is made well in relation to cases like Galileo in David
C. Lindberg & Ronald L. Numbers, eds., When Science and Christianity Meet
(2003).
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“experimental” approach.11 He specifically defended his demure from offering
an explanatory account of gravity on the grounds that one should not turn to
“hypotheses” as a substitute for experimental evidence.12
Theological Dimension of Eighteenth-Century Natural Philosophy
 Many of the emphases of “modern science” that earlier scholars
suggested were firmly in place by the outset of the eighteenth century in
England have been called into question already. The suggestion which recent
scholarship has most contested is the separation of “scientific” investigation
from religious or theological considerations. In keeping with its medieval
roots, natural philosophy at the outset of the eighteenth century retained an
overarching theological perspective.13 Its subject-matter was nature, but it
typically approached nature as the “book of God’s works.” Moreover, it
assumed that part of its task was to elucidate the attributes of God that could be
demonstrated from God’s works.
Newton can again serve as our example. The “General Scholium” that
he added as the capstone to Principia was devoted mainly to insisting that “this
most beautiful system of the sun, planets, and comets could only proceed from
the counsel and dominion of an intelligent and powerful being,” and then
elucidating the attributes of this being which we can deduce from “his most
wise and excellent contrivances of things.” He concluded these reflections with
an explicit affirmation that such discourse about God, drawn from
consideration of nature, “does certainly belong to natural philosophy.”14
There were occasional figures like Thomas Hobbes who adopted purely
materialistic accounts of nature, but these remained rare in England into the
last quarter of the eighteenth century.15 Thus, Wesley was echoing the
methodological assumption of most of his sources when 
11See Peter R. Anstey, “Experimental versus Speculative Natural
Philosophy,” in P. Anstey & J. Schuster (eds.), The Science of Nature in the
Seventeenth Century (2005), 215–42.
12Newton, Mathematical Principles (1729), 2:205 & 2:392.
13This point was pressed initially by Andrew Cunningham. Most have
come to agree; cf. Peter Dear, “Religion, Science and Natural Philosophy:
Thoughts on Cunningham’s Thesis,” Studies in the History and Philosophy of
Science 32 (2001): 377–86; and Peter Harrison, “‘Science’ and ‘Religion’:
Constructing the Boundaries,” Journal of Religion 86 (2006): 81–106.
14Newton, Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, 2:388–92.
15See Jeremy Gregory, “Christianity and Culture: Religion, the Arts, and
the Sciences in England, 1660–1800,” in Jeremy Black (ed.), Culture and Society
in Britain (1997), 102–23.
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he described the goal of his compendium of natural philosophy as “not barely
to entertain an idle barren curiosity, but to display the invisible things of God,
his power, wisdom, and goodness.”16 If Wesley went beyond his sources, it
was in his characteristic hope that the collection would also “warm our hearts,
and fill our mouths with wonder, love, and praise!”17
Characteristics of Wesley’s Engagement with the Natural “Sciences”
By this point it should be clear that it would be anachronistic to speak
of Wesley bringing “science” and “religion” into dialogue. He was not
engaging “science” as a discipline separated carefully from theological
considerations. Nor was he interested in “religion” in general. His main goal in
publishing Survey (and related items) was to enable his readers to benefit from
“book of God’s works” as well as the “book of God’s Word,” by distilling and
presenting—in accessible format—current studies of the natural world. In the
judgment of some historians of science, the result was the best single survey
treatment of natural philosophy in the eighteenth century for general readers.18
Focused on Descriptive Natural Philosophy
Wesley’s concern to speak to general readers surely contributed to a
central characteristic of his writings in this area—the dominant focus on
describing the natural world. He articulated this focus directly in the preface to
Survey:
It will be easily observed that I endeavor throughout not to account for
things, but only to describe them. I undertake barely to set down what
appears in nature, not the cause of those appearances. The facts lie
within the reach of our senses and understanding, the causes are more
remote. That things are so, we know with certainty; but why they are
so, we know not.19
While this restricted goal falls short of the full agenda of natural philosophy, it
is not hard to catch echoes of Newton in Wesley’s 
16Wesley, Survey, Preface, §1, Works (Jackson), 14:300.
17Ibid., §7, Works (Jackson), 14:302.
18Robert Schofield, “John Wesley and Science in 18th Century England,”
Isis 44 (1953): 337–38. 
19Wesley, Survey, Preface, §5, Works (Jackson), 14:301.
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delimitation. Besides, Wesley’s “compendium of natural philosophy” was not
intended to advance the discipline, but to survey the most interesting and
instructive aspects of nature highlighted in recent work in the discipline.
As with his publications in biblical studies, English history, and church
history, Wesley worked more as an editor than an author in the area of natural
philosophy. To frame and provide the largest portion of text for the first
edition of Survey he chose a Latin text by Johann Franz Buddeus.20 The bulk of
Buddeus’s text was devoted to surveying the natural world—beginning with
the human body; moving to other animals; then to plants, fossils, and the
physical elements of earth, fire, and water; before turning toward the heavens,
considering air, meteors, and cosmology. Wesley retained each of these
sections in Survey, though he omits a subsequent section devoted to debates in
physics (in keeping with his limitation to “describing,” not “accounting for”).
His abridgements within the various sections are infrequent, and sometimes
amusing—such as deleting descriptions of human reproductive organs.
More striking are Wesley’s additions to Buddeus. He incorporated into
the first edition of Survey entire new chapters describing birds, fish, and
reptiles, as well as numerous scattered additional examples of natural species
and phenomena. Apparently judging that Buddeus’s text did not provide
enough description of the wonders of God’s creation, Wesley scoured a
number of books and journals to supplement. This gathering of additional
information continued after the first edition of Survey was issued, being
incorporated into later editions to swell the original two-volume work to five
volumes. Wesley also laced his Journal and the Arminian Magazine with his
own observations on natural phenomena and excerpts from his reading on the
topic.
Inclined to a Modest Natural Theology
To be sure, Wesley pauses periodically in Survey to offer theological
reflections upon the wonders of the natural world being described. These
reflections lead some to describe the Survey as a “natural theology.” While
understandable, this could be misleading.
“Natural theology” was a sub-discipline in medieval education devoted
to knowledge about God that could be demonstrated by rational reflection on
1) the human soul; 2) human moral insight, or “natural law”; and 3) the natural
world. Thus, natural theology drew the occasional theological reflections of
natural philosophy into a larger 
20J. F. Buddeus, Elementa Philosophiae Theoretica (Halle: Glauche-
Hallensis, 1706).
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systematic conversation about what could theoretically be known about God
apart from special revelation.
I stress the theoretical nature of this knowledge, because natural
theology was part of the Christian curriculum and its wisest medieval
practitioners were aware that they were reflecting on the “book of nature”
through lenses shaped to some degree by the “book of scripture.” Their
concern was less to elicit faith from non-believers than to confirm and enrich
nascent faith. But not all voices were so wise. Thus, there was plenty of fodder
to fuel the suspicion of Protestant reformers about the triumph of unregenerate
reason over revelation in the enterprise of natural theology. While they did not
set the enterprise aside entirely, the Reformers’ emphasis on the sufficiency of
God’s revelation in Scripture rendered theological appeal to the “book of
nature” clearly subordinate and surely not essential for Christian life.
This is a point where Anglican theological reflection diverged from
more staunchly Protestant approaches. The roots of this difference go back to
Richard Hooker, who argued that, while scripture is sufficient for the
knowledge of salvation, all Christians should be encouraged to seek the
fullness of understanding and felicity, which is derived from conjoined study
of scripture and nature. This emphasis underlies the significant interest in
natural theology that emerged in England in the middle of the seventeenth
century and carried through Wesley’s life into the nineteenth century.21 Wesley
drew upon several of these works in natural theology for the theological
reflections interspersed through Survey.
Given the use of these sources, why did Wesley designate the Survey a
work in “natural philosophy” instead of “natural theology”? Part of the answer
was the difference in amount of attention given to nature itself in each genre.
Works in natural philosophy devoted the majority of their time to describing
the natural world, usually gathering their explicit theological reflections in a
short section at the end. By contrast, efforts in natural theology—like William
Derham’s Physico-Theology (1713) and Astro-Theology (1715)—were
organized around and dominated by theological reflection, interspersing brief
appeals to the natural world as spring boards for or evidence backing their
theological claims. On this spectrum, Wesley’s Survey lines up much closer to
the “natural philosophy” pole.
Another reason for Wesley’s choice, I would suggest, was difference in
tone. Prominent works of natural theology in his day were sliding 
21See Richard G. Olson, Science and Religion, 1450–1900 (2004), 84–91;
and David M. Knight, Natural Science Books in English 1600–1900 (1972),
47–62.
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from the more modest classical stance of seeking to confirm belief, into the
more ambitious Enlightenment evidentialist apologetics.22 The latter is a stance
which assumes that the path to reliable knowledge requires first setting aside
all belief, then accepting as truth only those claims for which there is
undeniable evidence. On this model, the prime task of natural theology
becomes demonstrating God’s existence, not merely reflecting upon evidence
of God’s wisdom and character; and the standard to be attained becomes
certainty. This model could also encourage more strident rhetoric. John Ray’s
Wisdom of God Manifested in the Works of Creation can serve as an example.
Peppered through this work are comments that anyone who does not recognize
that the world was produced by divine reason and art must be “stupid as the
basest beasts,” “stupid as the dirt one walks on,” “forsaken of reason,” and
“sottish.”23
Wesley recognized this shift in some of his sources, and he was not
ready to follow. But it is easy to miss this point. One must pay attention to
Wesley’s selective appropriation of his sources. For example, while he
incorporated at least four extracts from Ray’s Wisdom of God into Survey,
Wesley chose none with the type of strident apologetic agenda just cited.
While we still await a critical edition of Survey that highlights such editorial
decisions, initial comparative study shows that Wesley typically edits his
sources to remove evidentialist apologetics.24 Thereby the theological
reflections incorporated into Survey portray on balance a modest tone and
agenda. They value consideration of the “book of nature” not as the foundation
for belief in God or God’s various attributes, but as a means of strengthening
the faith, reverence, and love awakened by scripture, a means of building
nascent convictions into demonstrative convictions. John Hedley Brooke,
recent Professor of Science and Religion at Oxford University, has argued that
Wesley’s Survey remains of theological interest today precisely because its
modest claims are less prone to the dangers in more evidentialist natural
theologies.25 
22See Nicholas Wolterstorff, “The Migration of the Theistic Arguments:
From Natural Theology to Evidentialist Apologetics,” in R. Audi & W.
Wainwright (eds.), Rationality, Religious Belief, and Moral Commitment (1986),
38–81.
23Ray, The Wisdom of God Manifested in the Works of Creation (4th edn.,
enlarged;1704), 39, 47, 122–23, 249, 389.
24See details in Maddox, “John Wesley’s Precedent.” The Center for
Studies in the Wesleyan tradition, Duke University, is at work on a critical edition
of the Survey.
25John Hedley Brooke, “Science and Dissent: Some Historiographical
Issues,” in Paul Wood (ed.), Science and Dissent in England, 1688–1945 (2004),
21.
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Convinced of God’s Care for the Whole Creation
Wesley’s engagement with natural philosophy is also of continuing
interest because of how it led him to revise a received theological viewpoint,
moving to a stance that could do better justice to scripture! While scripture
speaks of God’s ultimate salvific goal as the “new heavens and earth” (i.e.,
transformation of everything in the universe), a variety of influences led
Christians through the first millennium to assume increasingly that our final
state is “heaven above.” The latter was seen as a realm where human spirits,
dwelling in ethereal bodies, join eternally with all other spiritual beings—a
category that did not include animals!—in continuous worship of the ultimate
spiritual being, God. By contrast, they assumed that the physical universe,
which we abandon at death, would eventually be annihilated. Wesley imbibed
this understanding of our final state in his upbringing, and through much of his
ministry it was presented as obvious and unproblematic.
In the last decade of his life, however, Wesley reclaimed the biblical
imagery of God’s cosmic renewal, shifting his focus from “heaven above” to
the future new creation.26 After a tentative defense of animals having “souls”
in 1775, he issued a bold affirmation of salvation for animals in the 1781
sermon “The General Deliverance.” While not without precedent, this sermon
was unusual for its time and is often cited as a pioneer effort in reaffirming the
doctrine of animal salvation in the Western church. Broadening the scope even
further, Wesley’s 1785 sermon on “The New Creation” refused to limit God’s
redemptive purposes to sentient beings, insisting that the very elements of our
current universe will be present in the new creation, though they will be
dramatically improved over current conditions.
What contributed to Wesley’s reclaiming of the biblical theme of the
cosmic scope of redemption? A central factor was his engagement with works
in natural philosophy that utilized the model of the “chain of beings.” This
model conceived of nature as a hierarchy of beings organized by relative
excellence of abilities. Fish were higher in the chain than plants, dogs higher
than fish, humans higher than dogs, and celestial beings higher than humans. A
central assumption of the model was that the only type of cosmos fitting for a
Perfect Being to produce was one in which every conceivable niche was
occupied by its appropriate type of being. The task of natural philosophers was
to place each creature 
26See Randy L. Maddox, “Nurturing the New Creation,” in M. D. Meeks
(ed.), Wesleyan Perspectives on the New Creation (2004), 21–52.
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in its appropriate niche—a task kept lively in the eighteenth century by
accounts of species in the new world from European explorers.
While it was eventually replaced, Clarence Glacken argues that the
model of the chain of beings was a crucial source for the modern ecological
ideas of the unity of nature and the balance and harmony of nature.27 Glacken
particularly highlights the role of John Ray and Charles Bonnet in adapting the
model to frame surveys of the burgeoning knowledge of the natural world in
the eighteenth century. Wesley was familiar with Ray’s Wisdom of God from
the early 1730s. He encountered the writings of Charles Bonnet, a prominent
Swiss naturalist, in the early 1770s. It was through Bonnet that Wesley gained
deeper appreciation for the implications of the chain of beings. Indeed, he
came to value the model so highly that he incorporated an abridgement of
Bonnet’s 2-volume overview of the chain of beings into Survey in 1777.28
One significant emphasis that Bonnet reinforced for Wesley was our
human connection with the rest of the chain. He retained in his abridgment of
Bonnet a response to the suggestion that it would be better if humans were
angels, which counsels:
Confess your error and acknowledge that every being is endued with a
perfection suited to the ends of its creation. It would cease to answer
that end the very moment it ceased to be what it is. By changing its
nature it would change its place and that which it occupied in the
universal hierarchy ought still to be the residence of a being resembling
it, otherwise harmony would be destroyed. In the assemblage of all the
orders of relative perfections consists the absolute perfection of this
whole, concerning which God said “that it was good.”29
If this is taken seriously, there can be no eschatological ideal that limits
salvation to humanity (even in the subtle form of stressing that humans are
“microcosms” of the whole cosmos). It would be a thwarting of God’s creative
will and a deprivation of all concerned!
Wesley’s pondering of this point as he read and abridged Bonnet in the
mid-1770s surely played a role in his reclaiming of cosmic redemption shortly
thereafter. As an Anglican, raised with deep appreciation for the conjoined
witness of the book of scripture and the book of nature, Wesley welcomed an
insight from the study of nature in his day that 
27Clarence J. Glacken, Traces on the Rhodian Shore (1967), esp. p. 379.
28Charles Bonnet, The Contemplation of Nature (1766); cf. Survey (3rd
edn., 1777), 4:60–333.
29Wesley, Survey (3rd edn., 1777), 4:62.
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brought back into focus a biblical (and early Christian) theme that had been
obscured.
Dedicated to Placing Knowledge in Service to All
One other characteristic of Wesley’s engagement with the study of
nature in his day deserves attention. It concerns the purpose of this study.
Rejecting earlier notions of natural philosophers as individual seekers after the
arcane mysteries of the natural world, Francis Bacon had helped make standard
by Wesley’s day a self-understanding of natural philosophers as public figures
in service of the public good.30
Wesley’s embrace of this basic emphasis is evident in The
Desideratum; or, Electricity Made Plain and Useful (1760). Like Survey, this
volume contains extended extracts from recent works on electricity by
Benjamin Franklin, Richard Lovett and others. But Wesley makes clear in the
preface that he is much less interested in the “philosophical” parts of these
treatises that posit explanations of how electricity works than he is in the
scattered accounts of medical benefits of electrical shock.31 While some
viewed these accounts with scorn, Wesley collected them and added accounts
from his own experiments in public clinics with “electrifying machines.” He
then published them inexpensively, for the public benefit of the poor in
particular. (For more on Wesley’s medical interests, see the next chapter).
But there was a specific current in Bacon’s writings on natural
philosophy which Wesley resisted—the tendency to emphasize human control
and exploitation of the natural world.32 Wesley was familiar with champions of
this anthropocentric, exploitive emphasis in scientific investigation. He had to
look no further than William Derham, who insisted “We can, if need be,
ransack the whole globe, … penetrate into the bowels of the earth, descend to
the bottom of the deep, travel to the farthest regions of this world, to acquire
wealth, to increase our knowledge, or even only to please our eye or fancy.”33
This is one of the passages from Derham that was not selected by
Wesley for inclusion in Survey. Nor does anything in its vein from other
sources appear there. Part of the reason is that Wesley imbibed more deeply
than Derham the convictions of the chain of beings model of nature. While this
model highlights (as ecologists would today) a 
30See Stephen Gaukroger, “The persona of the Natural Philosopher,” in C.
Condren et al. (eds), The Philosopher in Early Modern Europe (2006), 17–34.
31See Desideratum, Preface, §§2–3, Works (Jackson), 14:242.
32See Carolyn Merchant, The Death of Nature (1980), 164–90.
33Derham, Physico-Theology (1713), 112.
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range of ways that any particular species might contribute to the well-being of
others above or below it in the chain, it also insists that every species has
intrinsic value and a right to exist for its own purposes. John Ray, who was
deeply shaped by this model, emphasized the relevant implication: “It is a
generally received opinion that all this visible world was created for man, that
man is the end of creation, as if there were no other end of any creature but
some way or other to be serviceable to man. … Yet wise men nowadays think
otherwise.”34 While Ray went on to insist that, in this interdependent chain, all
species are in some sense serviceable to humanity and we would frustrate the
purposes of their creation if we did not make appropriate use of them, he
offered Wesley a model of modest anthropocentrism.
Wesley appropriated this model in a way that moved beyond Ray
through his distinctive emphasis regarding our role as “stewards.” This
emphasis is seen most clearly in his instructions on the use of money, where he
criticizes any suggestion that resources put at our disposal are for us to use
however we see fit. Wesley insists instead that everything belongs ultimately
to God; that it is placed in our care to use as God directs; and that God directs
us to use it for the benefit of others once our basic needs are met.35 Extending
this principle to the rest of creation, the focus of Wesley’s environmental ethic
is better characterized as theocentric than anthropocentric. He portrayed the
ideal relationship of humanity with creation (modeled by Adam in the Garden
of Eden) as one of modest stewardship, where we devote our distinctive gifts
to upholding God’s intentions for the balance and flourishing of all creation.36
Most in Wesley’s day shared his assumption of the idyllic nature of the
original creation, with peace abounding between all creatures and humans
possessing the knowledge to promote the thriving of the whole. They also
shared the recognition that this was very unlike the world in which we live
now, with “nature red in tooth and claw” (Tennyson) and humans largely at the
mercy of the forces of nature. Differences emerged around the implications
drawn from the present condition for human interaction with the rest of nature.
Many resigned themselves to the situation, as long as we are in the present
world. Among the ones who believed that change was possible, the most
significant distinction 
34Ray, Wisdom of God (4th edn., enlarged;1704), 127–28.
35See Sermon 28, “Sermon on the Mount VIII,” §§11, 25–26, Works,
1:618–19, 628–29; Sermon 50, “The Use of Money,” Works, 2:266–80; and
Sermon 51, “The Good Steward,” §I.1, Works, 2:283.
36See Sermon 60, “The General Deliverance,” §I.6, Works, 2:444.
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emerged between those (like Francis Bacon) who championed the mandate to
reclaim the mastery over creation that was lost in the fall, and those (like
Wesley) who pleaded for resuming the loving stewardship of creation that we
inverted in the fall.37 While the first two alternatives could acquiesce to (or
even justify) the aggressive domination of other creatures by humans, Wesley
is representative of the third alternative in his portrayal of such domination as
the epitome of the fallen practices that must be set aside.38 Deeply aware of
how much damage we have done, the stewardship that Wesley called for us to
resume is not only modest but chastened.39
This ideal, alongside Wesley naming his compendium of natural
philosophy a Survey of the Wisdom of God in Creation, suggests a significant
revision of Bacon’s rationale for the study of nature. We should seek this
knowledge not to increase our ability to exploit nature but to increase our
awareness of the wondrous range of creation and deepen our sensitivity to our
integral connection with it all—so that we might more effectively imitate God
in showing mercy to all of creation.
37See Peter Harrison, “Subduing the Earth: Genesis 1, Early Modern
Science, and the Exploitation of Nature,” Journal of Religion 79 (1999): 86–109;
esp. 102–3.
38See esp. his description of the negative impact of humanity upon creation
in Sermon 60, “The General Deliverance,” II, Works, 2:442–45.
39See Randy L. Maddox, “Anticipating the New Creation: Wesleyan
Foundations for Holistic Mission,” Asbury Journal 62 (2007): 49–66.
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